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The role of the Navy Research and Development Labora-
tories has, historically, lacked precise definition. Budge-
tary pressures result in a continuing assessment of the in-
house laboratory asset requirements. Recent improvements
in mission and role assignments and laboratory resource
management should be expanded and focused to guide any con-
templated changes in the size or the make-up of the labora-
tory system.
This study attempts to (1) summarize the laboratory
missions and goals; (2) describe the NAVMAT laboratory
resources and capabilities; (3) summarize the various studies
on the laboratory system; (4) examine new and evolving weapons
acquisition policy for impact on the laboratory system; and
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In this post war era, the Federal Government is confron-
ted with changing budget priorities for national defense and
social programs. Depending on the assumed threat, there is
a reduced dependence on the Navy contribution for national
defense. In light of this, the Navy must consider a variety
of alternatives for maintaining an effective Naval Force with
relatively smaller budgets.
There have been a myriad of studies conducted to deter-
mine the need for the Department of Defense (DoD) Laboratories
and recommendations for improvement. The consensus of opinion
from the various studies is that (1) the laboratories are
needed and (2) a variety of improvements are in order. There
is no clear definition of the role of the Navy Laboratories and
a number of institutional and management problems hinder the
coalition of the Laboratories/Centers into an efficient Center/
Laboratory system (Hillyer 1977)
.
The DoD in-house laboratory system is large and complex.
An underutilization of the existing laboratory capabilities,
and an active government policy to increase the private
sector's share of DoD Research and Development (R&D) is
resulting in a number of changes in size and make-up of the
DoD Laboratory system. Long range DoD Laboratory recommenda-
tions are to reduce both the Army and Navy Laboratory complex
in a surgical manner such as to maintain the necessary overall
defense capability (Allen 1975).
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It is the premise of this thesis that an objective
technology audit of private and Government R&D organizations
claiming technological expertise, facilities, and accomplish-
ments will show where the R&D dollars should be efficiently
concentrated. Such an audit would focus R&D efforts along
the lines of proven performance and capabilities according
*
to national priorities. A mechanism is needed to bring
forward the unique ideas for serious consideration regard-
less of the originating agency or person (s)
.
For simplicity, labs, laboratories and centers are used
synonymously in this thesis.
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of
Navy R&D Laboratories in terms of missions assignments and
capabilities, changing government-wide procurement policy,
and organizational change management. This thesis is in-
tended to (1) identify Naval Material Command CNAVMAT)
Laboratory roles, resources and capabilities to the Navy
operational users, (2) identify the magnitude and current
status of Navy R&D Laboratory resources for high government
level management purposes, and (3) to suggest strategies for
organizational change.
This thesis is not intended as a history report,
although brief laboratory history outline and references are
provided. The problem of utilization of the federal lab-
oratories for all United States government agencies is
11

recognized and addressed, however, the details of this
thesis are largely limited to the NAVMAT Navy R&D Laboratories
It is hoped that the results of this thesis suggest a
rational approach to an optimum management and utilization
of the Navy Laboratory system and that this in turn will serve
as an example for other Federal Agencies Laboratory manage-
ment. Recognition of some of the organizational and political
factors are examined for influence on the role of laboratories
in systems acquisition.
C. METHODS OF RESEARCH
An extensive literature search was performed to develop
the role of the laboratories from the time of the Navy
military scientific community inception during World War I
to the early 1970s. Personal interviews and correspondence
examine the period from 1974 to the present (late 1977)
.
This writer's experience in the active military [United
States Air Force) , as a Defense Contractor (7 years) and as
a Laboratory Scientist/Manager (10 years) provided necessary
insight for understanding the contributions and motives of
those engaged in weapon acquisition.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Figure 1 is an organizational flow diagram for this
thesis. The right path represents general observations of
the Federal Laboratory system. The left path represents a




































thesis is intended to be an unbiased and scholarly view of
the organizational factors of systems acquisition, it is
only fair to warn the reader of this writer's prejudice to
his current job as a Laboratory Scientist/Manager.
Any errors in facts and interpretation, to
the extent in which they affect the conclusions and recom-






The Navy Laboratories have long been partners in the
Weapon System Acquisition (WSA) process along with the Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) , the Navy Systems Commands
(SYSCOMS) , Industry, and recently the joint services. A
historical evolution of the federal laboratories, and, in
particular, the establishment of the Navy scientific com-
munity is useful since some of the problems evident at the
inception of this community remain today. The following
history of the Navy scientific community was predominantly




1 . Founding of Government Laboratories
The DoD in-house R&D organizations trace their his-
tory back to the establishment of the Springfield Arsenal in
1790. The traditional role of the Arsenal systems was for
the production of war materials
.
Prior to World War I (WWI) , Navy weapons were pro-
duced under the control of the Bureau of Ordnance and the
several Naval Ordnance Stations. These stations were com-
manded by Officers who had both ordnance experience and
considerable sea duty. The stations missions ranged from gun
and powder factories to ammunition depots. Example of this
kind of activity was the Naval Gun Factory at Washington, D. C
15

which had a century of ordnance experience by the time of
WWI . This expertise was instrumental in a technology transfer
leading to a rapid production of guns and ammunition by the
industrial base during WWI . The mission of production of
war materials was specified by Congress in 10 U.S. Code 4532
during WWI which stipulated that:
"The Secretary of War should have his supplies
made in factories or arsenals owned by the United
States, so far as those factories or arsenals can
make those supplies on an economical basis".
2. Founding of the Navy Scientific Community
Secretary of the Navy Daniels, along with the American
public, was shocked by the news of the sinking of the unarmed
passenger liner, the Lusitania, on the afternoon of May 7,
1915, by German torpedoes. He recalled a recent newspaper
article in which the famous inventor Thomas A. Edison had
expressed his views on how technology could be put to better
use for the national defense. At the time, Edison was 6 8
years of age and had, as reinforcement to his own inventive
mind, a well staffed industrial research laboratory at West
Orange, New Jersey. Daniels wrote Edison and began an
exchange which led to the appointment of Edison as head of
the Navy Consulting Board in July of 1915, but a year passed
before the board was given official status and was granted
$25,000.00 for expenses. This is considered to be the
earliest beginnings of the Navy's Scientific R&D Community.
In this same period, a Council of National Defense
was established that was essentially the..-President ' s War
16

Board (Secretary of War, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor)
,
and the Navy Consulting Board was made the Official Board of
Inventions. The most aggressive action of the Navy Consult-
ing Board was to conduct a publicity campaign by it's Committee
of Industrial Preparedness. On March 15, 1916, concurrent
with the Preparedness Campaign, Secretary Daniels, Thomas
Edison, and three other members of the board appeared before
the Committee of Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives
and presented a proposal for the Naval Research Laboratory.
The proposal was for a laboratory with significant involve-
ment in applied weapons research as distinguished from basic
research. Edison was a man of ideas A sometimes .of .differing
ideas. Extracts of his concept of the laboratory follow:
"As to the character of the laboratory itself, I
recommend that it be one that is constructed, arranged,
and run as a works for the rapid construction of
experimental machines and devices . .
.
The great practical inventor elaborated. .
.
"I do not think that scientific research work to
any great extent will be necessary. Research work in
every branch of science and industry, costing count-
less millions of dollars and the labor of multitudes
of men of the highest minds, has been carried on for
many years . All of this has been recorded, and yet
a ridiculously small percentage has yet been applied
and utilized. It is therefore useless to go on piling
up more data at great expense and delay while we are
free to use this ocean of facts.
"As to the management of the proposed laboratory,
I believe it should be civilian"
.
The biggest job of the consulting board turned out
to be screening of inventions of possible application to the
war. There was unbriddled optimisn that "good old yankee
ingenuity" would provide a unique weapon that would quickly
17

turn the tide of battle, and indeed, a tidal wave of ideas
and inventions swept toward Washington from across the
nation. At the crest of the wave, 600 letters a day poured
in.
Of the 110,000 suggestions that came to the board
and the Navy from the public, about 110 had enough merit to
be submitted by the senior examinors to the committee,
where they were reviewed by members of the board cognizant
of the particular area. Of these 110 ideas, only one was
put into production. The inventions by the members of the
board were of a different caliber, but the results were much
the same. The most prolific contributor was Edison himself,
along with his large and able staff in the Edison laboratory.
Some devices representative of his work are listed
below:
-A sonic apparatus for detecting submarines
-A device for covering merchant vessels with smoke
-Quick-turning apparatus for ships to avoid torpedoes
-Antitorpedo Nets
-Manned buoys for coast submarine patrol
-Compound for smudging enemy periscopes
Afterward Edison said:
"I made about forty-five inventions during the war,
all perfectly good ones, and they pigeon-holed every
one of them. The Naval Officer resents any interfer-
ence by civilians. Those fellows are a close corporation."
The earliest traceable roots for what emerged as the
Navy Laboratory system has its beginnings at Clark University
18

in the work and words of Dr. Arthur G. Wehster, pioneer
American Ballistician and early advocate of scientific
involvement in national preparedness. Webster was
profoundly influenced by German research. He served
for three years under Dr. Albert A. Michelson, the famous
Nobel Prize winner with a Naval background. Webster's
first assistant at Clark Universities Ballistic Institute
was Louis Ten Eyck Thompson, who became the Navy's first
civilian ballistician involved in peacetime ordnance develop-
ment at the Naval Proving Ground (NPG) Dalgren and later
became the first Technical Director of the Naval Ordnance
Test Station (NOTS) . Dr. L.T.E. Thompson profoundly
affected the philosophy of weapon research in the Navy.
Two other members of the Ballistic Institute at that time,
Dr. Robert Goddard and Dr. Clarence N. Hickman, would
become pioneers in American rocketry.
The Bureau of Ordnance and the industrial base had
more than two years of preparing for war production prior
to 1917. Even so, as of January 1, 1917, the Bureau of
Ordnance consisted of 13 officers and 39 civilians (mostly
clerical) . While there was a rapid build-up of war related
scientific effort, most of the WWI work was done at the
existing Ordnance Stations, Upon the armistice signing on
November 11, 1918, all war related research came to a
standstill (Christman 1971) .
There was a remarkable influence of WWI upon the
manner in which the next world crisis would be met. World
19

War II CWWII) preparation included applying the lessons
learned from WWI regarding the use of science. This led to
the greatest scientific mobilization known to man. Through-
out WWII, the scientific community exhibited a "can do"
response to the military needs. Permanent R&D laboratories
were established (such as the Naval Ordnance Test Station
(NOTS) , China Lake, California, and the Naval ; Ordnance. Lab
(NOL) , White Oak, Maryland) and staffed with a close knit
team of military and civilian scientists. The laboratory
system contribution to the war included such military products
as penetrator weapon fuzing, high-speed torpedoes, rockets
nuclear weapon components and radars
.
The basic principles of the military/civilian joint
operations management were established in late 19 46 with the
NOTS and NOL organizational structure and "Principles of
Operations" approval by Admiral Hussey. These laboratory
charters were designed to allow a strong measure of scientific
freedom and initiative within the overall framework of Navy
administration. This action ultimately influenced the
operational philosophy of other military R&D laboratories
.
This team operational philosophy was maintained for many
years with increased or decreased emphasis depending on top
management personalities
.
For a variety of reasons, not explored herein, the
laboratory operational behavior began a gradual trend toward




The military R&D activities in the late 1940s were
typified by no formal R&D planning process, no separate
appropriation and no detailed R&D procedures. In contrast,
Navy R&D management in 19 74 was characterized by numerous
organizational and procedural complexities (Qurollo 1974)
.
There is a normal pattern of cycle of national
defense activities (R&D and production both in-house and
out-house) which corresponds to periods of war or limited
conflicts. The pattern of winding down these war related
efforts follows shortly after the war; at least through the
Korean War.
The current position in the military cycle is one of
winding down the prolonged activity associated with the Viet
Nam conflict in the face of a growing awareness of the Soviet
War capacity.
Documentation of the corporate memory of significant
events in the evolution of Navy R&D management since WWII
is detailed in the comprehensive report "Review of Navy R&D
Management, 1946-1973" (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. 1976)
21

III. MISSIONS AND ROLES OF NAVMAT LABORATORIES
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Chief of Navy Material (CNM) assumed command
of the major Navy Laboratories. In the next four years the
fifteen laboratories that then existed were consolidated into
seven research centers and three supporting laboratories
.
The purpose of the consolidation was to bring together in a
single command the various capabilities necessary to attack
complex military problems in specific warfare areas (Munro 1973)
Subsequent consolidation has resulted in eight (current)
NAVMAT commanded laboratory/centers . NAVMAT also indirectly
commands numerous SYSCOM laboratories. Figure 2 shows the
NAVMAT Laboratories command chain.
Some of the Navy missions and roles are supported by the
Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs) . A recent study
recommended "that the FCRCs be retained and protected in
essentially their present roles". This recommendation was
meant to read as a strong endorsement of current defense policy
in utilization of the FCRCs (Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (ODDR&E) 19 76) .
B. ESTABLISHING NAVMAT LABORATORY MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
In 19 74, an ad hoc panel established bv RADM F. C. Jones
DCNM (Development) undertook a review of laboratory missions
and functions (Hollingsworth 1974) . This review was a major
input to the NAVMAT instruction which defined for each of
the (then) 9 NAVMAT laboratory/centers, Naval Research Lab
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functions in terms of product areas and product lines
(NAVMATINST 5450. 27A 22 Dec 1975). Further, the labora-
tories were to develop with the sponsors a five-year plan
which sets forth anticipated work assignments based on the
latest five year defense plan (FYDP)
.
C. CURRENT NAVMAT LABORATORY ROLES AND MISSIONS
NAVMAT Corporate Plan for Laboratories states:
"The specific roles, functions and operations of
these lab/centers are stated in NAVMATINST 5450. 27A
of 22 Dec 1975. This instruction was developed to
redress the imbalance between competition and coop-
eration by refining the roles and responsibilities
of the CNM in-house lab/centers and of industry.
The instruction also made provisions for the lab/
centers to maximize the utilization of the expertise
and facilities available from other labs and activi-
ties, particularly those within DoD, to avoid non-
essential duplication of existing capabilities"
(Probus 1977)
.




Probably no class of institution has been studied
and analyzed, praised and criticized, organized and
reorganized to the degree that has been the lot of the
in-house defense laboratories (Glass 1967) . Table II shows
a summary of the various laboratory studies . Data shown
through the year 19 7 3 was taken from "Review of Navy R&D
Management, 1946-1973" (Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc. 1976) .
An Office of Naval Research (ONR) report provided additional




Missions of CNM Laboratories and Centers
NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NADC)
The principal RDT&E center for naval aircraft systems
less aircraft-launched weapon systems.
NAVAL COASTAL SYSTEM LABORATORY (NCSL)
The principal activity for conducting RDT&E in support
of Naval missions and operations that take place primarily
in the coastal (continental shelf) regions. Includes RDT&E
for mine countermeasures , diving and salvage coastal and
inshore defense (less ASW) , swimmer operations and amphibious
operations
.
NAVAL OCEAN SYSTEMS (NOSC)
The principal RDT&E center for command, control and
communications; ocean surveillance; surface and air launched
undersea weapon systems and supporting technologies.
NAVAL PERSONNEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NPRDC)
The principal Navy activity for conducting human resources
RDT&E in the areas of manpower, personnel, training and
education; serves as coordinating activity for all human
resources RDT&E for the Navy. Also provides RDT&E support
and services to the Systems Commands and to CNM laboratories
as necessary to augment and stimulate human factors efforts
in the RDT&E new systems for operational use.
DAVID W. TAYLOR NAVAL SHIP R&D CENTER (DTNSRDC)
The principal RDT&E center for Naval vehicles and
logistics; provides RDT&E support to the U.S. Maritime
Administration and the maritime industry.
NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER (NSWC)
The principal RDT&E center for surface weapons systems,
ordnance, mines, and strategic systems support.
NAVAL UNDERWATER SYSTEMS CENTER (NUSC)
The principal RDT&E center for submarine warfare and
submarine weapon systems.
NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER (NAVWPNCEN)
The principal RDT&E center for air warfare systems
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2 . Impact of Recent Studies
Much of the recent studies were summarized in the
"Allen Report", 19 75. This report is examined in some
detail here as it appears to be having significant impact
on size and makeup of the laboratory system.
a. The Allen Report
The DoD Laboratory Utilization Study was initi-
ated in 1974 by Dr. M. R. Currie, DDR&E, in response to
management objectives stated by the Secretary of Defense.
This study focused on four basic issues (Allen 1975)
:
1) Are DoD in-house labs needed?
2) How should RDT&E be organized and managed?
3) What should be the in-house ratio of RDT&E
effort?
4) What is the proper size of the lab complex?
The Navy input to this study concluded the
following (Hazen 1974)
:
1) Navy labs are needed and resources are
reasonably matched with requirements.
2) Navy technology base efforts are unduly
fragmented.
3) That Navy early R&D and technology base
programs ought to be under a single command




The ODDR&E follow-on study concluded that there
is a vital role for the laboratories that is not satisfactorily
available from other sources such as industry, universities,
FCRC's, SYSCOMS , etc. The combination of attributes pos-
sessed by the laboratories include CAllen 1975)
:
1) Planning of systems development acquisition
and the useage and planning of the Technology
Base program to support future systems
development
.
2) Providing technical advice and supervision
to the service agency in the systems
acquisition developments and purchases.
3) Providing an alternate source of technology
(competition) so as to stimulate industry
performance.
4) Providing centers of excellence in areas of
little or no industrial interest.
The ODDR&E concluded that the following problems
exist and recommended that the Navy undertake their solutions
:
1) Redundancy in function/platform assignments
and concomitant escessive interlaboratory
competition for funds.
2) Technology base fragmentation, uneven quality
and inhibited technology transfer.
3) Lack of a system for control of individual




4) Under utilization of junior officer personnel
in the laboratories and overdependence on
senior officers for positions of technical
responsibility.
Further, there is excessive in-house effort in
the Navy for materials and structures, electronics and con-
ventional weapons. This study recommends a reduction in
strength of 10 to 15% of the people in the DoD Laboratory
system (strength then was 56,000) to take place in FY 76
and FY 77 (Allen 1975)
.
b . The NMAEC Report
In 1974, the Secretary of the Navy established a
Navy/Marine Corps Acquisition Review Committee CNMARC) to
study the Navy's system acquisition process and to make
recommendations for changes and improvements . With regard to
the generation of requirements the R&D panel of the NMARC
noted the organizational imbalance in the Navy user-producer
relationship and recommended that the role of users and
producers need to be clarified with regard to CD authority,
responsibility, and accountability for control of R&D funding
and C2) the generation of requirements.
Among problem areas highlighted by the NMARC
study were
1) Due to competition and scarcity of funds,
mission sponsors are reluctant to fund for





2) Pressure to select an approach without
adequate assessment of risk.
3) Over-optimism or salesmanship on part of
R&D community.
4) Over-emphasis on need for early introduc-
tion of hardware into fleet.
The NMARC recommended certain organizational and
procedural changes to improve the situation.
E. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY LABORATORY (DNL) CORPORATE LONG-RANGE
PLAN
Individual laboratory/NAVMAT long-range plans were com-
bined into an initial corporate plan which summarizes (1) the
DNL corporate goals, objectives and initiatives; (2) projec-
tions for planning; (3) product area summary and analysis;
and (4) DNL executive assessment. This plan is to be updated
annually (Probus 1977)
.
The primary goal of the DNL corporate plan is to clarify
laboratory/center missions and functions. Goal A is:
"To emphasize within the lab/center complex the
need for clear understanding, acceptance and observa-
tion of assigned missions and functions in order to
reduce undesired competition and to foster maximum
cooperation in the development of knowledge and prod-
ucts to meet Navy needs" (Probus 1977)
.
This corporate plan calls for the lab/centers to utilize
the expertise and facilities available from other labs and
activities, particularly those within DoD , to avoid non-
essential duplication of existing facilities. Further, it
is expected that the labs/centers will function increasingly
as a federation, or community of closely cooperating centers.
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F. MISSIONS AND ROLES ENFORCEMENT
Each laboratory plays unique, but not mutually exclusive,
roles. A certain degree of overlap of work assignments and
activity initiated technology exploration is inevitable, if
for no other reason, due to lack of complete communication
and coordination within NAVMAT Laboratories. This situation
is potentially much more redundant when other Navy Labora-
tories, other service laboratories, other Federal Laboratories,
and our NATO allies' R&D activities are considered.
Perhaps the greatest source leading to redundant activities
is the difficulty in defining systems boundaries. There is
a natural inclination, in the interest of completeness, to
define a limit of system responsibility as one element
beyond the perceived system boundary,
The CNM intends to "monitor planned work assignments"
and "adjudicate conflicts among laboratories and sponsors
competing for limited resources" (NAVMATINST 5450. 27A 1975).
However, overlap of laboratory activities remains and there
is no evidence of high level coordination of government
wide laboratory activities (Allen 1975)
.
There is no activity known to this writer which would
assign missions and roles to the entire Federal Laboratory





IV. NAVMAT LABORATORY RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The NAVMAT Laboratory/Center capabilities and resources
are complex and extensive. In the aggregate, there are
1.1 million acres of facilities valued conservatively in the
billions of dollars, employing 22,000 scientists with an
annual expenditure of over 1 billion dollars. Until one
examines the details of this complex orgranization, there can
be no evaluation (sizing, apportionment) of how well the
laboratories function and what changes might be beneficial.
B. NAVMAT LABORATORY RESOURCE INFORMATION
The Federal laboratory resource information is inadequate
for use in assessment of the NAVMAT laboratory resources
and capabilities. This inadequacy is in terms of data content.
NAVMAT laboratory resource data should specify human resources,
number of acres and where located, unique facilities and
capabilities (high-speed rocket sled, underwater torpedo
firing ranges, supersonic wind tunnels, etc) . Table III is
general NAVMAT Laboratory data, however detailed information
is readily available from NAVMAT and the individual labora-
tories. These data serve to identify laboratory facilities
and capabilities to the operational forces and other poten-
tial users. Laboratory points of contact are included as
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V. UTILIZATION OF FEDERAL LABORATORIES
A. INTRODUCTION
From Fiscal Year 1969 to Fiscal Year 1977, total Federal
R&D obligations increased from $15.6 billion to an estimated
$23.5 billion, for an annual growth of 5.2%. Most of this
growth has taken place in recent years with a rate of 10.4%
from 1974 to 1977. Twenty-six billion dollars is an esti-
mate of the Fiscal Year 1978 Federal R&D budget (U.S.
National Science Foundation (USNSF) 1976) .
About one third of the R&D budget ($8 billion for Fiscal
Year 19 78) will be expended by Federal in-house centers/
laboratories for salaries, benefits and travel.
The national defense share of total R&D has been aver-
aging over 50% of the total R&D budget. The Fiscal Year
1977 estimates were 51% national defense, 12.5% space, 9.7%
health, 8.6% energy and the remaining 18.2% divided among
the many other agencies (U.S. National Science Foundation
1976)
.
B. PROBLEMS IN UTILIZATION OF FEDERAL LABORATORIES
On April 8, 19 74, testimony to the hearings before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session,
included an investigative report entitled "Utilization of
Federal Laboratories" (U.S. House of Representative Hearing
1975) . This report attempted a comprehensive listing of all
Federal Laboratories, staffing and equipment.
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The summary data reported, as of June 30, 19 72, indi-
cated 834 Federal Laboratories with an estimated value in
excess of $14 billion. Total laboratory space is 176 mil-
lion square feet with 260,000 employees (95,000 professional)
at an annual salary and benefit cost of nearly $4 billion
per year. Travel and all other costs of $2.4 billion bring
the total staffing costs to $6.4 billion 1972 dollars (U.S.
House of Representative Hearings 1975) . Given a 5% per
year growth, Fiscal Year 19 78 costs of this category would
exceed $8 billion. This assumes that the total number of
laboratories and employees is constant.
Although 3 million square feet of laboratory space was
reported as unoccupied (full value unknown), construction
was in progress on 58 additional facilities costing $350
million and renovation underway on 52 existing facilities
at a cost of $180 million.
Despite the enormity of the overall investment of the
Federal Laboratories and the related operating expenses,
there is no Government wide system of review, coordination,
and control to insure efficiency and economy of operation.
No agency or department, except perhaps the DoD, has
made any effective effort to even develop necessary
information as to the total laboratory resources available.
The data base used for the "Utilization of Federal
Laboratories" report was generated under National Science
Foundation (NSF) grants (U.S. National Science Foundation
19 73) . This report made recommendations regarding
38

inter-Governmental use of Federal R&D Centers and Labora-
tories. Among the conclusions of this report were the
following:
(1) Federal R&D Centers will never be utilized
effectively within the Federal Government itself,
let alone inter-governmentally , in the absence of
a strong managerial system backed by policy directives
(2) The OMB should examine the status, roles, and
organizational logic of the Federal Laboratory
population as an opportunity for reorganization
action to capture the efficiencies and economies
of scale in utilization which would be expected
from an integrated systems management.
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VI. ACQUISITION POLICY IMPACT ON FEDERAL LABORATORIES
A. INTRODUCTION
During the 19 50 cold war era, there was a perceived
technology race against the Soviets. Defense Systems
Acquisition strategy could be characterized by having per-
formance and schedule as driving factors. There was little
time for requirements definition of major systems. Concur-
rency in development and production was normal practice.
Cost growth, poor performance, duplication of design and
effort were prevalent among the services . These problems
and many others were detailed by early analysis (Peck and
Scherer 1962)
.
Major System Acquisition reform was sought, and resulted
in DoD 3200.9 (1965) , a major policy guidance directive
issued on Concept Formulation and Contract Definition by
Secretary of Defense McNamara . This was the first "building
block" in the establishment of a coordinated framework of
policy formulation and implementation for DoD systems acqui-
sition. Policy formulation and decision making shifted from
the services to the highest levels of DoD. This process
eventually led to a formalized decision process which is known
today as Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
.
There was a flurry of government studies of the acqui-
sition process during these times. The Blue Ribbon Defense




(1) The services were faulted for developing
requirements that were too specific.
(2) The needs of the operating forces were being
subordinated to the parochial interests within
the services.
(3) The services bias towards oversophisticated
weapon systems.
These requirement determination criticisms imply that
the formulation of needs were still unstructured, uncoor-
dinated and lacked control. The panel further criticized
the lack of a meaningful program review after the initial
Office of Secretary of Defense (QSD) decision to proceed
into Engineering Development, the over optimism of contrac-
tors and services to deal with technical unknowns, reliance
of "paper studies" versus critical hardware experiments,
and the inhibiting effects on innovation after the initial
OSD approval
.
Mr. Packard's policy guidance of 19 70 resulted in DoD
5000.1 and formalized the DSARC process. The intent of
this directive was to:
1) decentralize decision making from OSD to the
service components,
2) define authority and responsibility for key
organizations and individuals
,





Due to continuing procurement disasters, Congress commis-
sioned (HR 474, PL 91-129), the Commission on Government
Procurement (COGP) in 1969. Unlike most investigations of
the acquisition process, the COGP looked at the entire
procurement process. The commission's analysis resulted
in a recommendation for a complete systems approach to
systems and twelve major recommendations which are summa-
rized in Table IV.
Public Law 93-400 established the Officer of Federal
Procurement Policy COFPP) within the Office of Manpower and
Budget COMB) as a result of one of the recommendations of
the COGP. OMB Circular A-109, issued in April 1976, ad-
dressed Major Systems Acquisitions, Major systems are
defined as those costing $75 million R&D or $300 million in
production. Lesser dollar value programs are encouraged to
follow the A-109 philosophy COMB Circular A-109 1976)
.
B. ACQUISITION POLICY ELEMENTS SUMMARY
A summary of acquisition policy elements is as follows:
1. OMB Circular A-76 C1966 )
Made it the policy of the Government to rely on the
Government sector for such goods as are commercially avail-
able, specified goals for the kinds of activities to be
contracted out, proportions of in-house versus out-house
activities, and comparison standards for judging in-house
versus out-house performance. This circular is currently
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2. OMB Circular A-109 (1976 )
Re-emphasized OMB Circular A-76 which has yet to be
seriously implemented, advocates a "systems approach" which
emphasized high-level approval of an agency's need prior to
the initiation of systems development and production, re-
quires assignment of a program manager upon an approved need,
development of an acquisition strategy, and a thorough ex-
ploration of alternatives prior to selecting the preferred
solution(s)
.
3. OMB Circular A-ll
Provides guidance to all agencies on how to put their
Fiscal 1979 budget requests together including instructions




Asks the question, "what are the funds for and what
is the priority in terms of national defense; and why is it
needed?" Mission budgeting will translate to proportioning
defense dollars according to national priorities.
5 Zero Base Budgeting
Zero base budgeting requires management to justify
everything they are doing or are about to do. Instead of
just setting forth incremental proposed budget increases,
as has been the past situation, the manager mast first justify
the baseline program budget and then present alternatives
involving any increases or decreases to the baseline program.
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6 . Federal Acquisition Act of 1977
This basic procurement bill (Senate Bill 1264)
promotes the greater use of functional specifications,
greater use of commercial products, reduced sole source
competition (to promote efficiency), reduced Government
surveillance of contractors effort, and directs single,
simplified uniform Government wide procurement regulations.
C. OMB CIRCULAR A-109 IMPACT ON FEDERAL LABORATORIES
1. Acquisition Executive
Each agency is to designate an "acquisition executive"
to integrate and unify the management process for the agency's
major systems acquisition; also monitors agency's practices




Each agency will designate a "program manager" (P.M.)
for each major acquisition. The P.M. will be given budget
guidance and a written charter of authority. Each agency
will prevent management layering hindering the P.M. ability
to perform.
3 Application of Technology Programs
OMB A-109 emphasizes programs based on needs rather
than opportunities. Technology programs will not be pushed
into hardware development unless there is a tie to a need
or a deficiency. Consequently, there may not be an immediate
hardware application for much of the technology base program
that is conducted in-house. This will probably lead to a
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prioritization of technology base program elements based
on relationship to near term "needs" or frequency of hard-
ware application.
4 . Role of In-House Laboratories
The OMB Circular A-109 laboratory role specifics are
detailed in the circular (OMB Circular A-109 1976, para 8F,
IOC, 11C) . Further details are found in a pamphlet on Major
Systems Acquisition (OFPP Pamphlet No. 1, 1976) .
Briefly, the laboratories (1) are not to dominate the
systems acquisition process, (2) should manage, maintain and
stimulate the technology base, (3) should provide objective
program management support in analysis, need justification,
acquisition strategy preparation, technical consultation,
test and evaluation, and in service support (including prod-
uct improvement) . In general, if an in-house R&D Laboratory
has a solution to a need, it may propose the concept as an
alternative. In doing so, the laboratory acts as a contractor
and will largely be excluded from the primary laboratory
functions (P.M. support).
The detailed impact on the laboratories is as
follows (Dietrich 1976)
:
a) A closer relationship with the program manager
and sponsor agency is inferred. The laboratories




b) There should be less contracting out by both the
agency and the laboratory for management and
engineering evaluation.
c) Do not contract lifeblood activities (such as
planning) .
'
d) Re-orient thinking to "needs" versus "solutions"
and apply resources accordingly.
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VII. POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS
OF LABORATORY ROLE CHANGES
A. INTRODUCTION
The Congressional role in determining the future course
of the Navy cannot be overestimated. In terms of the budget,
33% must now be authorized (with efforts in process in the
House to increase this to 100%) , all of it must be appropri-
ated, and with the emergence of the new Budget Committees,
the entire budget is subject to more thorough scrutiny than
ever before, as these committees will strive to limit the
overall size of the budget thereby further enhancing the
competition for increasingly scarce dollars (Henning 19 77)
.
The Federal Laboratory role is being molded in an envi-
ronment that is not strictly rational. This research makes
a fundamental assumption that the environment in which these
changes are occurring is a combination of the three concep-
tual models (rational, organizational, and political) which
Allison describes at length in "Conceptual Models and the
Cuban Missile Crisis" (Allison 1969) . Thus, what cannot be
understood from a strictly rational context becomes plausible
from an organizational/political viewpoint. Figure 3 is a
summary outline of conceptual models
.
B. EXAMINATION OF LABORATORY ROLES BASED ON THE RATIONAL
MODEL
The rational model is normative and prescriptive. That
is, it views a situation as it should be rather than how it
is. A rational approach to a problem has sometimes been
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Rational behavior calls for simplified models that
capture the main features of a problem without capturing
all its complexities. The simplifications have a number
of characteristic features: (1) Optimizing is replaced
by satisfying - the requirement that satisfactory levels
of the criterion variables be attained, (2) Alternatives
of action and consequences of action are discovered sequen-
tailly through search processes, (3) Repertories of action
programs are developed by organizations and individuals,
and these serve as the alternatives of choice in recurrent
situations, (4) Each specific action program deals with a
restricted range of situations and a restricted range of
consequences, (5) Each action program is capable of being
executed in semi-independence of the others — they are only
loosely coupled together .
Action is goal-oriented and adaptive. But because of
its approximating and fragmented character, only a few ele-
ments of the system are adaptive at any one time; the remain-
der are, at least in the short run, "givens." So, for
example, an individual or organization may attend to improv-
ing a particular program, or to selecting an appropriate
program from the existing repertory to meet a particular
situation. Seldom can both be attended to simultaneously
(March 1958)
.
A major change in the Federal approach to budgeting
expenditures occurred in 19 65 with the introduction of
"planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS)." This
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system attempts to introduce program budgeting as a consis-
tent tool of analysis at all levels of Federal expenditures.
A distinguishing feature of PPBS is its focus on the "output,"
or "mission," of an agency. A program can be defined as a
combination of Governmental activities that produce distin-
guishable outputs (Hyman 1973)
.
OMB Circular A-109 and the various other procurement
reforms (Chapter VI) were initiated to (1) insure a valid
program need; (2) broaded the choice of systems options;
(3) establish policy and procedures such that there is con-
sideration of life cycle cost effectiveness from program
inception. These procurement reforms are in concert with
PPBS and tend to increase the rationality of the (rational)
PPBS system.
However, the incremental nature of the Government has
prevented the widespread acceptance of PPBS (Lindblom 19 69)
,
and it is likely that procurement reforms will be met with
a similar unwillingness to make major change.
Wildavsky argues
:
"We have to be prepared to accept the possibility
that PPBS lacks necessary as well as sufficient con-
ditions, that its disabilities occur not merely in a
program implementation but in policy design - that,
in a word, its defects are defects in principal, not
in execution. . .PPBS sacrifices the rationality of
ends to the rationality of means; that is why seem-
ingly rationale procedures produce irrational results"
(Wildavsky 1974)
.
C. LABORATORY ROLES AND THE BUREAUCRATIC OR ORGANIZATIONAL
MODEL
A "one-thing-at-a-time" or "ceteris paribus" approach to
adaptive behavior is fundamental to the very existance of
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something we can call "organizational structure." Organi-
zational structure consists simply of those aspects of the
pattern of behavior in the organization that are relatively
stable and change only slowly .. .organizational short-run
adaptiveness corresponds to problem-solving; long-run adapt-
iveness correspons to learning (March 1966)
.
The bureaucratic model or organizational behavior rests
on the observation that a large, complex, formally structured
organization is not a single, monolithic, purposeful machine
dominated by a single, optimizing individual, the leader.
Rather it consists of semi- independent , even semi-feudal,
loosely allied suborganizations , each with a substantial
life of its own (McNallen 1973)
.
The bureaucratic model assumes that organizational
behavior, outputs and actions are the combination of pre-
programmed outputs of diverse, largely independent, uncoor-
dinated suborganizations of a large bureaucracy, each
detecting and reacting to stimuli and functioning according
to its standard pattern of behavior. This model considers;
(1) the factors of organizational stability and cohesiveness
(which involve inertia and maintenance of the status quo)
;
(2) the organizational feasibility of decisions (which
involve avoiding disruptions and conflict within the
organization)
.
D. LABORATORY ROLES AND THE POLITICAL OR BARGAINING MODEL
The political model is based on analyzing the power
relationships between participants in the organization. The
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political model has the individuals at or near the top of an
organization as a player in a central competitive game called
"politics." Organizational goals and objectives are gener-
ally achieved by resolving differences through bargaining.
The political or bargaining model makes the assumption that
the outputs or actions or behavior of organizations can best
be understood as a resultant of the bargaining games. The
output in the form of a budget is called a resultant because
the final budget outputs are not necessarily those outputs
desired by any of the participants involved in the process
(McNallen 1973)
.
Bargaining occurs in two formats. Adaptive bargaining
concerns simple adjustments in the level of past agreements
(an example would be adjustments to next years budget to
achieve previously accepted goals) . Intensive bargaining
concerns the goals, objectives and policy of an organization
and involves adding new programs and activities and the cut-
back of resources to achieve these disputed goals. Intensive
bargaining is the more disruptive of the two types of
bargaining.
E. DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTUAL MODELS
It is not a purpose of this thesis to examine potential
changing laboratory roles by various conceptual models, but




Analysts think about problems in terms of largely implic-
it conceptual models that have significant consequences for
the content of their thought (Allison 1969)
.
The bureaucratic politics approach (a combination of
bureaucratic and political conceptual models) is a new and
valuable perspective on Governmental decision-making. It
focuses attention on previously underrated or ignored aspects
of policy formulation and implementation. Organizations are
biased and parochial; the assumption of the rational actor
model are extremely unrealistic. The bureaucratic politics
approach appears to be particularly well suited for the
analysis of low or mid-level issues and to issues of policy
implementation (Caldwell 1976)
.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR LABORATORY ROLES
1 . Rational
The role and size of the Navy R&D Laboratory system
is undergoing a resource drawdown. Various rational procure-
ment policy laws and initiatives will assist in achieving
these high Government level goals . The lack of central
resource management and agency commitment to central resource
management is not rational. There is no apparent method of
measuring Government laboratory return on investment; nor is
there adquate means to compare the overall efficiencies of





The government laboratory system lacks specific high
level management objectives and is frequently counter-
constrained to meet program objectives.
2 . Organizational
The organizational inertia will stabalize the change
process. Reorganizations and consolidations will eventually
provide the necessary laboratory efficiencies. New procure-
ment policy experience will reveal shortcomings. Critical
to the success of the OMB Circular A-109 process will be the
early success of the initial trial programs. On the other
hand, if A-109 results in increased program duration and
dollars to come up with the same old solution, there will be
further modifying policy changes undertaken.
A serious conflict for organizational consideration
is the inability of the laboratory system to select those
people it wishes to terminate. The seniority system can
conceivable cause (1) the best people to voluntarily leave;
(2) allow the unsatisfactory employees to remain; (3) deny
entry of new talents and skills. The long term effects are
obvious
.
Another organizational conflict is the phenomenon
which occurred when NAVMAT assumed command of the laborato-
ries in 1966. Prior to that, the laboratories had been in
the direct line of authority exercising chain of command
over the laboratories in which they had the greatest interest.
The reorganization changed the SYSCOMS role in relation to
the laboratories from that of manager to the status of
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customer. As customer, the systems commanders have greatly
reduced opportunity to influence laboratories policies and
management practices. This has an impact on budget acquisi-
tion and budget defense. A major laboratory financial
channel remains through the SYSCOMS while the management
channels are direct to NAVMAT. A further effect of this
relationship is the difficulty of enforcing mission assign-




The major political factors affecting the NAVMAT
laboratory roles are located at the highest Government
levels. Congress is trying to regain control of the budget,
and DoD expenditures represents a major portion of the con-
trollable budget. The Congress has shown a strong tendancy
to micromanage the technical programs within DoD. Changing
political administration most often results in new top level
management and reform legislation.
The trends are clearly in the direction of prolonged
drawdown. The politics of retaining the status quo (fighting
reductions-in- force and base closings) will have limited
success (according to power politics) unless the perceived
military threat increases. Even then, there will be much
discussion about what kind of war, where is the war and when,
how long will it last and what is the agency's anticipated
contribution to the defense effort, etc.
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VIII. MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS FOR CHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
The title of this chapter is not intended to imply that
significant change will occur in the existing laboratory
system. Rather, the hypothesis is that the management con-
cepts herein are potentially useful regardless of the lab-
oratory role change.
The literature speaks to two major types of planning
activities; strategic and tactical.
Steiner contends that:
"Strategic planning is the process of determining
the major objectives of an organization, and the
policies and strategies that will govern the acquisition,
use and disposition of resources to achieve these
objectives" (Steiner 1969)
.
Tactical plans support strategic planning; are done at lower
levels on a regular schedule, have fewer alternatives and
greater degree of certainty. In short, tactical plans are
used to implement the desired strategy.
B. APPROACH TO CHANGE
"At the moment, we should consider whether the
advantages of a consciously considered strategy are
worth the effort it obviously requires. Four con-
siderations suggest an affirmative answer. They
are the inadequacy of stating goals only in terms
of maximum profit, the necessity of plannina ahead
in undertaking rather than merely responding to
environmental change and the utility of setting
visible goals as an inspiration to organizational
effort" (Learned 1969) .
The last two considerations are particularly important




Structuring an organization directly for its objectives
not only makes them apparent but also specifies the teams
of people required to carry them out. It is easy to distin-
guish at least two kinds of objectives in organizations. The
first is maintaining predetermined standards of performance
from the repetitive business and functions of the business.
The second is bringing about changes to improve the business.
For convenience, let us call the first "functional perfor-
mance objectives" or "performance maintenance objectives",
and the second "change objectives" or "improvement objectives"
It should be evident that the strategy — and, therefore, the
organization — for maintaining the status quo will differ
from the strategy and organization required for improving it
(Sherwin 1976)
.
There are three main informational inputs to R&D strat-
egy - environmental forecasts, capability analysis, and the
corporate strategy. Before deciding on a strategy, it is
essential to make a realistic appraisal of one's own
strengths and weaknesses. Wishful thinking must play no
part in this exercise. Although it is useful to analyse
past and present capabilities, these may not be relevant to
future needs (Twiss 1974) . Figure 4 is a technology audit
framework which Twiss suggests could be useful in determin-
ing the corporate strategy and the efficient allocation of
resources. The first column gives examples of the types of
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include such data as airfield capability, unique test ranges
(live chemical testing, explosive safety limits), instrumen-
tation specialties, etc. The second column contains an
assessment of the current position in the form of a profile
to aid in the identification of areas of particular strengths
or weaknesses . The third column "Technological Capital for
the Future" is much more difficult. It's purpose is to
evaluate the laboratory's technological capabilities in
relation to future demands for future objectives. The con-
cept of technological capital focuses the mind on the future
and the real worth of the resources available. "Sunk costs







Peter Drucker says that:
"Effective executives build on strengths — their
own strengths, the strengths of their supervisors,
colleagues, and subordinates, and on the strength of
the situation, that is, on what they can do. They do
not build on weakness. They do not start out with
things they cannot do" (Logistics Management
Institute 1971)
.
The same advise would apply to organizations such as
R&D laboratories
.
2 R&D as a Business
A major objection to the application of formal plan-
ning to R&D is that many important technological inovations
originate in a random fashion. Chance plays an important
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role and the literature frequently alludes to "serendipity"
the facility of making happy and unexpected discoveries by
accident! But no organization is going to invest heavily in
technology solely as an act of faith in the hope that by
backing the right people 'something will turn up'. On the
other hand, it would be a short-sighted management which was
not prepared to consider an unexpected innovation on the
grounds that it had not been foreseen in the plans (Twiss
1974) .
The existing laboratory situation of "apparent"
planned R&D is useful in that it provides for a planned R&D
program and yet is prepared to absorb the unexpected inno-
vation. R&D is a separate budget activity and there is no
requirement that it be driven by current mission element
needs
.
3 Resource Management Improvement Requirements
Reflecting on the Federal Laboratory resource manage-
ment as viewed by Congress, defense contractors and informed
taxpayers, the sheer magnitude of laboratory expenditures
will invite scrutiny and efficiency reform. Recognize that
high management level consolidation and coordination appears
inevitable and local resource planning should consider this
eventuality.
4 Establishing Visible Goals
In the absence of clear and specific NAVMAT goals,
establish individual laboratory goals that are visible to
all employees. If those goals reflect "change objectives",

so be it. Align the laboratory goals as close to the
laboratory mission assignment as possible. Consider align-





The objective of this thesis was an overview of several
aspects of the laboratory system as opposed to a detailed
examination of any one aspect. There are organizational
implications for the Navy Laboratory system that should be
recognized by all those engaged in systems acquisition.
As a minimum, the intended implications of the arguments
presented here are six. First, the laboratory system has
grown very large and complex. The size and nature of labora-
tory business is seen as a threat to the peacetime sustenance
of the military industrial base. Thus there are many pres-
sures for a prolonged drawdown of in-house activities. How-
ever, there remains a requirement for the laboratories for
(1) SYSCOM and P.M. support; (2) military technology genera-
tion, particularly in areas where product demand is sporadic,
risky or unprofitable; (3) quick response to recover or
achieve a military threat advantage.
Second, the same pressures that a forcing a drawdown put
the laboratories in competition with each other for the in-
house business. The organizational structure is inadequate
for enforcing the mission and roles assignment. In some
cases, currently non-conforming expertise has taken years to
build, and would be difficult to transfer into alignment with
mission and role assignments. Strict mission and role enfor-




Third, the NAVMAT laboratory is in a preferred position
to centrally organize and distribute corporate resource and
capability data as an example for Federal Laboratory Resource
Management. This same information would be extremely useful
to the operational forces, Navy Laboratory personnel, other
DoD laboratories, federal and local government agencies, con-
tractors, etc. Laboratory R&D resource management on a
national level is a distinct possibility due to the large
expenditures involved.
Fourth, the various acquisition policies will impact the
kind of business the laboratories conduct and the manner in
which they conduct this business. Acceptance of these
policies will be slow, regardless of how directed. The
success of trail programs and absence of an interim military
crisis or critical need is essential to the success of policy
such as OMB Circular A-109
.
Fifth, political and organizational factors weigh heavy
in the changing make-up of the Navy Laboratory system. It is
useful to examine any major problem using the three models
(rational, organizational and political). Scientists tend to
analyze problems using only the rational model.
Sixth, given that organizational change will continually
occur, each organization should have corporate strategic and
tactical plans, an attitude or approach to change with the
appropriate organizational structure, and a thorough under-
standing of local corporate resources as well as those of
sister laboratories, other DoD laboratories, and industry.
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Organizational change should build on strengths and discard
weaknesses, recognizing the unique nature of R&D business.
There must be a clear understanding of the budget cycle.
Current individual budget position is a result of actions
taken three or more years ago. The laboratory goals should
be clearly visible to all employees and should be closely
aligned to the mission assignments. The laboratories should
take it upon themselves as a federation to transition
activities to improve mission alignment.
Finally, further studies are recommended in areas touched
in this thesis, particularly in the area of resource manage-
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